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Abstract
We present a new algorithm for polynomial time learning of optimal behavior in single-controller
stochastic games. This algorithm incorporates and integrates important recent results of Kearns and
Singh (Proc. ICML-98, 1998) in reinforcement learning and of Monderer and Tennenholtz (J. Artif.
Intell. Res. 7, 1997, p. 231) in repeated games. In stochastic games, the agent must cope with the
existence of an adversary whose actions can be arbitrary. In particular, this adversary can withhold
information about the game matrix by refraining from (or rarely) performing certain actions. This
forces upon us an exploration versus exploitation dilemma more complex than in Markov decision
processes in which, given information about particular parts of a game matrix, the agent must decide
how much effort to invest in learning the unknown parts of the matrix. We present a polynomial time
algorithm that addresses these issues in the context of the class of single controller stochastic games,
providing the agent with near-optimal return. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Stochastic games; Polynomial time learning in hostile environments; Exploration versus exploitation
in multi-agent systems
1. Introduction
Stochastic games (SGs) extend Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multi-agent
environment. In classical stochastic games [9], two players, the agent and the adversary,
engage in a series of competitive interactions. Thus, each state of an SG corresponds to
a zero-sum game between the agent and the adversary, called a stage-game (or simply, a
game, for short). Following each game, each of the players obtains some reward and both
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end up in a new state, corresponding to a new zero-sum game. The reward obtained by the
players is a function of the current game (and hence, the current state) and their actions.
Similarly, the new game is a stochastic function of the current game and the players’
actions.
Much like in MDPs, the agent’s goal is to find an optimal (or near-optimal) policy,
i.e., a mapping from states (i.e., games) to actions. However, unlike in MDPs, such
optimal policies are typically stochastic, i.e., each game is mapped to a probability
distribution over actions rather than to a particular action. The definition of the optimization
criteria for SGs is similar to that of MDPs, and include cumulative discounted reward,
cumulative undiscounted reward (where the number of steps is finite but unbounded),
average discounted reward, and average undiscounted reward; we concentrate on this last
criterion. Unlike in MDPs, there need not be stationary optimal policies for infinite horizon
stochastic games when the average undiscounted reward criterion is used, neither are there
known polynomial time algorithms for computing solutions for such games. However,
there is an important class of stochastic games in which stationary optimal policies in
the infinite horizon average undiscounted reward case exist, and they can be computed in
polynomial time. This type of game is called single-controller stochastic game (SCSG)
[3,8,10], a name which derives from the fact that the state transitions depend on the action
of the agent alone. Hence, the adversary’s action influences the rewards only. In this paper,
we concentrate on learning in SCSGs.
The learning algorithm that we present is based on Kearns and Singh’s (KS) E3 algo-
rithm [5]. E3 is a model-based learning algorithm (i.e., one in which a partial model of
the MDP is formed) that has introduced a number of new concepts and ideas in the area
of reinforcement learning. The extension of these ideas into SGs raises a number of issues
that stem from the existence of an adversary whose behavior is unknown. In particular, this
adversary can, at will, hide information from the agent by refraining from taking particular
actions or by rarely playing such actions. This means that, unlike MDPs where the tran-
sition function and rewards can be made known to the agent with sufficient exploration,
certain aspects of the model may never be known to the agent, or may take an unbounded
time to learn. Therefore, we cannot emulate the two phase approach of the E3 algorithm.
There, the agent first attempts to learn enough about the model to obtain near-optimal re-
turn, after which it enters an exploitation phase. Instead, we will have to allow for the
possibility of continuous learning.
Indeed, in stochastic games, a more complicated form of the exploration versus
exploitation problem arises. Recall that the exploration versus exploitation dilemma refers
to the question of whether to play optimally given the current knowledge, or to attempt to
increase knowledge at the risk of unknown losses. KS solve this problem in the context of
MDPs by using the fact that, if we know the value of the optimal policy of the MDP, we can,
at each stage, examine whether we have learned enough to guarantee ourselves this value.
Once this is the case, the agent needs no longer explore. Unfortunately, in SGs, this is not
the case. Because of the ability of the adversary to hide parts of the game matrix, in many
cases, we lack the information to calculate the value of a given policy. To overcome this,
we employ techniques introduced by Monderer and Tennenholtz in the context of learning
in repeated games [7]. Namely, we must explore at two levels. First, as in E3, we must
perform global exploration. That is, we must attempt to learn some facts about the different
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games and their associated transitions. In addition, we must perform local exploration as
well, where we attempt to gain more information about our possibilities within a particular
game. 1 Because it depends on the behavior of the adversary, this local exploration part
cannot be a-priori bounded. This is to be contrasted with the initial exploration phase ofE3,
which takes polynomial time.
The algorithm presented in this paper addresses these and other issues, and yields near
optimal performance for the agent in time polynomial in the basic problem parameters. It
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first such result for any non-trivial class of stochastic
games. Previous algorithms for learning in stochastic games [4,6] were not concerned
with analytic treatment and proof of efficiency, nor dealt explicitly with the exploration
versus exploitation issue in an efficient manner. However, Littman does provide asymptotic
convergence results, and both papers deal with SGs in general. Indeed, the existence of
polynomial-time near-optimal learning algorithms for SGs in general remains an important
open question, and we explain why our current approach fails when we move outside the
scope of SCSGs.
In the following section we discuss single-controller stochastic games. In Section 3 we
present our measure of complexity. In Section 4 we present our main theorem, which
makes use of two basic ideas. A discussion of the first idea, based on a recent algorithm
by Kearns and Singh [5] appears in Section 5. A discussion of the second idea, which is
in the spirit of work on learning in repeated games, and in particular follows recent work
by Monderer and Tennenholtz [7], is presented in Section 6. The synthesis of these ideas
into a complete algorithm is presented in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8. Appendix A
contains a version of the Chernoff bound result [1,2] upon which we rely heavily in various
proofs.
2. Preliminaries
We first define Single-Controller Stochastic Games [SCSG]:
Definition 1. A single-controller stochastic game [SCSG] M on states S = {1, . . . ,N},
and actions A= {a1, . . . , ak}, consists of:
• Stage Games: each state s ∈ S is associated with a zero-sum game in strategic form,
where the action set of each agent isA. The first player is termed agent and the second
player is termed adversary.
• Probabilistic Transition Function: PM(s, t, a) is the probability of a transition from s
to t given that the first player (the agent) plays a.
An SCSG is similar to an MDP. In both models, the agent’s actions lead to transitions
between states of the world. The main different is that the reward obtained by the agent for
performing an action depends on its actions and the actions of the adversary. To model
1 Note that the notion of local/global exploration is sometimes used in the context single agent reinforcement
learning literature with a different meaning. Here, we use the term local exploration to describe exploration within
the game associated with a state, and global exploration to describe the exploration of the global state space.
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this, we associate a game with every state, and we will use the terms state and game
interchangeably. Recall that a game in strategic form can be viewed as a matrix whose
rows correspond to the agent’s actions and whose columns correspond to the adversary’s
actions. Thus, the agent controls the choice of the row, while the adversary controls the
choice of the column. The entry in row i and column j in the game matrix contains the
rewards obtained by the agent and the adversary if the agent plays his ith action and the
adversary plays his j th action. In zero-sum games, the sum of these rewards (for any choice
of i and j ) is always 0. Here, we have made the simplifying assumption that the size of the
action set of both the agent and the adversary is identical. The extension to sets of different
sizes is trivial.
For ease of exposition we normalize the payoff of each stage game to be a non-negative
real number between 0 and a constant Pmax. We will also take the number of actions to be
constant across different stage games.
For a given SCSG, the set of possible histories of length t is (S ×A2)t , and the set of
possible histories,H , is the union of the sets of possible histories for all t > 0, where the set
of possible histories of length 0 is S. 2 Given an SCSG, a policy for the agent is a mapping
from H to the set of possible probability distributions over A. Hence, a policy determines
the probability of choosing each particular action for each possible history. A stationary
policy is a policy which depends only on S instead of on H . Such a policy associates with
each state a probability distribution over the actions.
In order to define the notion of the value of a policy, we proceed as follows: Given an
SCSG M and a natural number T , we denote the expected T -step undiscounted average
reward of a policy pi when the adversary follows a policy ρ, and where both pi and ρ
are executed starting from a state s ∈ S, by UM(s,pi,ρ,T ) (we omit subscripts denoting
the SCSG when this causes no confusion). Notice that given policies for the agent and
the adversary, an SCSG is transformed into a Markov chain (because the joint action for
each game is fixed). This means that for a given SCSG M , every initial state s and policies
pi,ρ define a probability distribution over possible T -step histories. Denote this probability
distribution by prs,pi,ρM , and denote the average reward obtained by the agent in the course
of some history h by R(h). UM(s,pi,ρ,T ) can be formally defined as
UM(s,pi,ρ,T )=
∑
T -step histories h
prs,pi,ρM (h)R(h).
We continue by defining UM(s,pi,T ) = minρ is a policyUM(s,pi,ρ,T ), denoting the
value that a policy pi can guarantee in T steps starting from s. If UM(s,pi,T ) is indepen-
dent of s we denote it by UM(pi,T ). We also denoteUM(s,pi)= lim infT→∞UM(s,pi,T ),
and UM(pi)= lim infT→∞UM(pi,T ) when the value is independent of s.
Finally, we will assume that the SCSG is ergodic in the sense that given any stationary
policy of the agent, the probability of transition between each pair of states is greater than
0 regardless of the adversary behavior. This makes the value of each stationary policy
well-defined (i.e., it is independent of the initial state). In particular, the value of M is the
2 The notion of history is required in order to properly define the value of a policy. However, it does not play a
part in the algorithm itself.
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value UM(pi∗) of an optimal policy pi∗ (and we know that for SCSGs, there is no loss of
generality in assuming this policy is stationary).
The ergodicity assumption is consistent with the treatment of [5], and is quite natural for
the following reasons. Any Markov chain defined by a policy has one or more absorbing
subsets of states. That is, subsets of the state space such that once the agent enters them,
he will remain in them. In the initial stages of learning, the agent cannot be expected to
know which policies will lead to which sets of absorbing states, and so we cannot really
influence the choice of an absorbing state set. However, once we are within such a set, we
would like to quickly learn how to behave. This is basically what we (and KS) offer.
3. Our measure of complexity
One of the important contributions of KS is the identification of the central parameter
upon which the analysis of algorithms for learning in MDPs must be based, namely, the
mixing time. Kearns and Singh [5] argue that it is unreasonable to refer to the efficiency of
learning algorithms without referring to the efficiency of convergence to a desired value.
They defined the ε-return mixing time of a stationary policy pi to be the smallest value
of T after which pi guarantees an expected payoff of at least U(pi)− ε. More formally,
in the context of SCSGs we say that a stationary policy pi belongs to the set Π(ε,T ) of
stationary policies whose ε-return mixing time is at most T , if after time T , pi returns an
expected (average, undiscounted) payoff of at least U(pi)− ε for every possible adversary
behavior. That is, on the average, we have to employ T steps of policy pi before our average
accumulated reward is sufficiently close to the value of pi . Notice that this means that an
agent with perfect information about the nature of the games and the transition function
will require at least T steps, on the average, in order to obtain a value (of almost) v using
an optimal policy pi whose ε-return mixing time is T . Clearly, one cannot expect an agent
lacking this information to perform better.
Notice that the mixing time of a policy depends on the adversary’s behavior: The agent’s
accumulated reward depends on his actions and on the adversary’s actions. Hence, the
adversary can influence the time it takes to obtain a particular sum of rewards, and we
must take this into account. Luckily, in SCSGs, we can show that the mixing time of any
policy is finite. This follows from the following observations. First, notice that given a
stationary policy, if we disregard the payoffs obtained in each state, we get a standard
Markov chain. 3 Now, given a particular stationary policy of the agent, the best response
of the adversary is static, in the sense that it is built from best response actions at each state.
If the adversary will use a different strategy from this best response strategy, the payoff of
the agent will only increase. (Again, in SGs in general this is not true, since the adversary
can influence the transition probabilities.) For a fixed policy of the adversary, it is possible
to calculate the appropriate mixing time. As we have just observed, any deviation from this
behavior will only increase the payoffs to the agent, thus decreasing the time needed to
obtain the desired value.
3 This does not hold for SGs in general.
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We denote by Opt(Π(ε,T )) the optimal expected undiscounted average return from
among the policies in Π(ε,T ). When looking for an optimal policy (with respect to
policies that mix at time T , for a given ε > 0), we will be interested in approaching this
value. In our algorithm, we shall assume that T and Opt(Π(ε,T )) are given, and we shall
attempt to learn a behavior whose average return is within ε from Opt(Π(ε,T )). Once this
problem is solved, we can, as in [5], remove these assumptions and measure the complexity
as a function of the mixing time of the (stationary) optimal policy, where this value, as well
as the value of the game are a-priori unknown.
4. The main theorem
Recall that we wish to obtain efficient behavior in SCSGs for agents that do not know
the transition probabilities a priori, nor do they know which games are associated with each
state. We can show:
Theorem 1. Given an SCSG M with N states and some ε > 0, denote the stationary
policies with ε-return mixing time T , by ΠM(ε,T ), and the optimal expected return
achievable by such policies by Opt(ΠM(ε,T )). Let 0 < δ,φ < 1 be constants. There
exists an algorithm LSG, which takes N,T , ε, δ,φ as inputs, and is polynomial in
N,T , 1
ε
, 1
δ
, 1
φ
, such that with probability 1− δ the expected return of LSG is greater than
(1− φ)(OptM(Π(ε,T ))− 2ε).
Two features are immediately apparent from the statement of this theorem: We have to
pay a small additive factor because of the fact that, as in MDPs, one cannot guarantee an
optimal payoff within a bounded amount of time—a fact that holds even when we have
an explicit, correct model. We also have to pay a multiplicative 1− φ factor which results
from the ability of the adversary to hide desired information—in order to overcome this, we
must perform some sampling throughout the process, which costs us a small, multiplicative
loss.
The proof of this theorem relies on the following observations:
(1) Since SCSGs share much structure with MDPs, we can adopt many aspects of
Kearns and Singh’s E3 algorithm to this context. One of the fundamental ideas
in this algorithm is the definition of a known state, i.e., a state for which the agent
has accumulated sufficiently accurate statistics with regards to both rewards and
transitions originating from it. We will adopt a similar notion, and utilize it similarly.
However, in our case, the rewards for different actions depend on the actions taken
by the adversary, who may act maliciously. Hence, careful adaptation of this notion
is required for our context. Once this is done, we can follow the ideas of [5],
regarding the exploitation versus global exploration issue. This point is discussed
in Section 5.
(2) Suppose that we have been able to learn some information about a particular stage-
game, and we attempt to employ an optimal policy with respect to this information.
For example, suppose that we have learned two out of three columns of a given
game, i.e., we have made sufficient observations of the outcome of all of our actions
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with two of the adversary’s three actions. However, so far, we do not have knowledge
of what happens when the adversary chooses this third action. Furthermore, suppose
that some action a is the optimal action when the adversary sticks to the two actions
we are familiar with. We have the following dilemma: we could try to exploit our
current information about the game, and decide to play a. However, if the adversary
chooses to start playing his third action now, and a is inadequate against this action,
we will attain low returns. On the other hand, we could decide that we need to
explore the whole game first, playing randomly until we learn enough about the
third column. However, we have no guarantee that the adversary will actually play
the third action and so we may learn nothing new while continuously attaining sub-
optimal returns. This issue is what we referred to earlier as the local explore versus
exploit problem, and our main problem will be to find some reasonable tradeoff
between these two options, one that will allow us to achieve the desired level of
performance. This issue is discussed in Section 6.
5. Exploitation with global exploration
We will make use of the following definition, which enables us to state a version of KS’s
simulation lemma [5] in the context of stochastic games.
Definition 2. Let M and M be SCSGs over the same state space. We say that M is an
α-approximation of M if for every state s we have:
(1) If PM(s, t, a) and PM(s, t, a) are the probabilities of transition to t given that the
action carried out by the agent is a, inM andM respectively, then, PM(s, t, a)−α 6
PM(s, t, a)6 PM(s, t, a)+ α.
(2) The game associated with s in M is the game associated with it in M restricted to a
non-empty subset of the columns.
Lemma 1. Let M and M be any SCSGs over N states, where M is an O( ε
NT Pmax
)2
approximation of M , then for every state s and policy pi we have that UM(s,pi,T ) >
UM(s,pi,T )− ε.
Proof. First, we prove the lemma with the following modification: instead of claiming
the above for every state s and policy pi , we will claim it for every state s, policy pi ,
and fixed adversary policy ρ. Clearly, if this holds, then the actual statement holds given
that UM(s,pi,T )
def= minρ UM(s,pi, e, T ). When the adversary’s policy is fixed, an SCSG
reduces to an MDP. If we make the additional assumption that M and M have the
same number of columns in every game, then our claim reduces to Kearns and Singh’s
Simulation Lemma [5]. However, we allow for M to contain games that correspond to
games from M , but where the set of columns corresponds to a strict subset of the set of
adversary’s actions. However, any restriction of the adversary’s actions can only result in
higher payoffs for the agent. 2
38 R.I. Brafman, M. Tennenholtz / Artificial Intelligence 121 (2000) 31–47
The last argument in the proof of Lemma 1 may lead the reader to think that the second
item in Definition 2 plays an insignificant role. However, as we now discuss, this aspect of
the definition relates to the major concept of this section, that of known states.
We say that a state is known if we know its associated transition probabilities within
a range of O( ε
NT Pmax
)2 from their true value, and we know at least one column in it.
This means that the agent knows the transition probabilities associated with each of its
actions, and, in addition, it knows the values appearing in at least one column of the game
matrix. Notice that a state may be considered known even though we do not have complete
empirical evidence about the game associated with that state. This point is crucial, and
differs from the situation in Kearns and Singh’s proof.
In what follows we will define the notion of an induced SCSG. Intuitively, the induced
SCSG corresponds to the agent’s current model of the true SCSG. This model is based on
the set of known states and contains an additional special state representing the set of all
unknown states. Then, in Lemma 2, we will show that for an induced SCSG, there is always
either a policy that attains near-optimal payoff or a policy that has some fixed minimal
probability of reaching the unknown state, and hence, of leading to new information.
Definition 3. Let M be an SCSG, and let L be any subset of the set of states S. The
induced SCSG, ML, has states L∪ {l0}, and transitions and state games as follows:
(1) The states in ML are associated with the same games as in M .
(2) The state l0 is associated with a game where the adversary obtains the value Pmax
for any joint action (a “worst case” state for the agent).
(3) For any action a, PML(l0, l0, a)= 1.
(4) For any states s, t ∈L, and a ∈A, we have that PM(s, t, a)= PML(s, t, a).
(5) For every s ∈ L, and t /∈L, and for every action a ∈A, we have that PML(s, t, a)= 0.
(6) For every s ∈L, and a ∈A, we have that PML(s, l0, a)=
∑
j /∈L PM(s, t, a).
What follows is the SCSG version of [5]’s “Explore or Exploit” lemma.
Lemma 2. Let M be an SCSG. Let L be any subset of S, and let ML be the corresponding
induced SCSG. Then, for any s ∈ L, and for every T and 0 < α < 1, we have that there
exists a policy pi in ML such that UML(s,pi,T ) > UM(s,pi∗, T )− α (where pi∗ denotes
the corresponding T -step optimal policy in M), or there exists a policy in ML such that
the probability that a walk of T steps of that policy will reach l0 exceeds α/Pmax for every
adversary behavior.
Aside from minor modifications, the proof of [5] carries over to this case as well.
However, because of its importance, and because it explains how to perform exploration,
we shall repeat it here.
Let pi be a policy for M satisfying UM(s,pi,T ) = UM(s,pi∗, T ), and suppose that
UML(s,pi,T ) < UM(s,pi
∗, T )− α (otherwise, pi is already a witness to the claim of the
lemma). We may write:
UM(s,pi,T )=
∑
p
PrpiM [p]UM(p)=
∑
q
PrpiM [q]UM(q)+
∑
r
PrpiM [r]UM(r),
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where the sums are over, respectively, all T -paths p in M , all T -paths q in M in
which every state in q is in L, and all T -path r in M in which at least one state is
not in L. Keeping this interpretation of the variables p,q and r fixed we may write∑
q Pr
pi
M [q]UM(q) 6
∑
q Pr
pi
ML
[q]UML(q) 6 UML(s,pi,T ). The first inequality follows
from the fact that for any path q in which every state is in L, PrpiM(q) = PrpiML(q)
and UM(q) 6 UMS (q). (This latter inequality is the only place where this proof differs
from [5].) This latter inequality stems from the fact that in ML, the adversary may have
fewer options to choose from (because some columns were deleted) and therefore, his
payoff may decrease. The last inequality stems from the fact that UML(s,pi,T ) takes the
sum over all T -paths inML, not just those that avoid the absorbing state l0. Thus we obtain
that
∑
q Pr
pi
M [q]UM(q) 6 UM(s,pi∗, T ) − α, which implies that
∑
r Pr
pi
M [r]UM(r) > α.
But
∑
r Pr
pi
M [r]UM(r)6 Pmax
∑
r P r
pi
M(r), and so
∑
r Pr
pi
M [r]> α/Pmax.
It is now natural to look atML, where L is the set of known states. The lemma presented
above tell us that if at each known state the adversary performs only actions that are
associated with fully known columns, then one can either find a policy which, if run
for T steps, attains the desired value (i.e., an exploitation policy), or a policy that, with
sufficient probability, will reach some unknown state (i.e., an exploration policy). In fact,
Lemma 2 shows that the optimal T -step policy forM is always either an exploration policy
or an exploitation policy for ML.
In order to utilize this result we can proceed as follows: Using Lemma 1 and the fact
that we know the SG’s value, we can compute the optimal policy for ML and determine
whether it is near-optimal. If not, we choose to explore. We can come up with a good
exploration policy by computing an optimal policy for M̂L, where M̂L is defined much as
ML, but such that in l0 the adversary obtains 0 reward for every joint action, and in L the
adversary obtains Pmax for every joint action. This policy is the policy with the highest
probability of attaining a non-L state within T steps. The Explore and Exploit Lemma
guarantees that if our initial attempt to find an exploitation policy fails, then this policy
will explore with sufficient probability.
We note in passing that this proof of the Explore or Exploit Lemma cannot be extended
effectively to handle SGs. It does imply that the optimal policy for M is either an
exploration or an exploitation policy for every adversary behavior. But we do not know
the optimal policy for M . Assuming we know the value of the SG, we can, as indicated
above, check whether its counterpart, the optimal policy forML, is good enough. However,
it is possible for this latter policy to be good enough given certain adversary behaviors and
insufficient given other adversary behaviors. If that is the case, then we do not have a
guaranteed exploration policy nor do we have a guaranteed exploitation policy.
Let us sum up the observations and ideas discussed so far. The basic idea is to define a
known state as a state which has been visited enough times to collect meaningful statistical
data on at least one column of the game matrix. When an agent reaches an unknown state it
will randomly select an action and execute it. (Notice that we cannot employ the balanced
wandering approach of KS, since an adversary can exploit this to prevent learning.) After
polynomially many steps, at least one state will become known with sufficient probability.
When an agent reaches a known state, it will perform exploration or exploitation
depending on the considerations described above. This requires the computation of the
optimal expected T -steps return in ML, where L is the set of known states, and this
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computation must be repeated each time a new state becomes known or a new column
becomes known. This computation can be performed in polynomial time (as a function
of N and T ) using standard dynamic programming updates. If the attained value is not
close enough to the desired value we will generate an exploration step in order to reach an
unknown state and make additional random sampling of actions.
Notice that there are only polynomially many parameters to learn (one for each joint
action in each state). After a number of successful explorations that is polynomial in
the problem parameters, we are guaranteed to have an exploitation policy. Of course, not
every exploration attempt is successful, rather each has a probability of at least α/Pmax of
succeeding. Using standard Chernoff bounds (see Appendix A) with high probability, after
a polynomial (in α/Pmax) number of explorations, all entries will be known. By choosing a
value for α that is polynomial in the problem parameters, we deduce that after polynomially
many stages, with high probability, all states become known or the value is obtained. (See
Section 7 for a more formal treatment of these observations.)
Unfortunately, the above analysis (which works for MDPs) is inadequate for SCSGs.
The reason is that in defining ML we considered only known columns of known games.
That is, we have implicitly assumed that in each game the adversary will execute actions
that correspond to known columns. Naturally, the adversary is free to play actions
corresponding to unknown columns. This can lead to lower payoffs. In the following
section we explain how this problem is dealt with.
6. Exploitation with local exploration
In the previous sections we modified the definition of a known state introduced by KS
in order to adapt their techniques to the context of stochastic games. However, we saw that
an adversary can exploit the existence of unknown columns within a known state, if we are
not careful. To handle this problem, we adopt techniques from the work of Monderer and
Tennenholtz [7] on learning in repeated games.
Lemma 3. Consider an SCSG M with N states and k actions, where the transition
probabilities are known and at least one column at each state is (fully) known. Consider the
policies whose ε-return mixing time is T , and let 0< θ,γ < 1. There exists an algorithm
polynomial in T ,N, 1
θ
, 1
γ
, 1
ε
such that its execution for polynomially many steps leads to
an expected average payoff of (1− θ)(Opt(Π(ε,T ))−ε) with probability of at least 1−γ .
Proof. The algorithm runs in stages that last at most T -steps. At each such stage, a T -step
optimal policy with respect to known columns only, pi , is computed. We know that pi has
an expected payoff of at least Opt(Π(ε,T )− ε), provided that the adversary selects only
actions which correspond to known columns. However, as there is no guarantee that the
adversary will act this way, we execute a policy pim instead of pi . pim is equivalent to pi with
probability of 1− θ/2, and with probability of θ/2 it randomly selects a time i between 1
and T and an action, and when the ith step in the execution is reached it executes this
randomly chosen action.
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A stage is considered finished if either:
(1) the policy has been executed for T steps, or
(2) either the adversary used an action that corresponds to an unknown column or the
agent deviated from pi .
It can be shown that the probability that unknown columns will be selected
(2T kNX/θ)3k2N times before all entries are known is less than k2Ne−2kNT X/θ . This
follows from the fact that (1) the probability of failure of learning all columns in at least
one set (from among k2N sets) of (2T kNX/θ)3 adversary deviations (i.e., selections of
unknown columns) is smaller than k2N times the probability of failing to learn in one such
set of deviations, and that (2) there are at most k2N entries to learn.
More specifically, the probability that an unknown entry will be learned by the agent
when the adversary selects a column which corresponds to an unknown entry is at least:
θ
2
1
T
1
k
. This probability is greater than θ/(2T kNX) where X > 1 (the actual value of
X will be determined as explained below). This implies that the probability that no
new entry will be learned after (2kTNX/θ)3 selections of unknown columns by the
adversary is lower than (1− 12kTNX/θ )(2kTNX/θ)
3
, which is by itself lower than e−2kTNX/θ .
Consider (2T kNX/θ)3k2N selections by the adversary of columns with unknown entries,
partitioned into k2N sets of equal size, each of which includes (2T kNX/θ)3 such
selections. The chances that at least one entry will remain unknown, among the k2N
entries, is bounded by k2N times the probability of not learning the value of an additional
entry along (2T kNX/θ)3 such selections. This implies that after (2T kNX/θ)3k2N times
columns with unknown entries have been selected, all entries in all games will be exposed,
with probability which is at least 1− k2Ne−2kT NX/θ .
We run the the algorithm for Y stages, such that (2T kNX/θ)
3k2N
Y
< θ2 and Y is polynomial
in the problem parameters. This will guarantee that the proportion of stages in which
we do not follow pi is smaller than θ/2. Hence, we must have Y > (2T kNX/θ)3k2N 2
θ
.
We also need to require that k2Ne−2kNT X/θ < γ . Hence, e2kNTX/θ > k2N/γ , or X >
log(k2N/γ ) θ2kNT . As can be directly observed from these inequalities, we can indeed
choose (polynomial)X and Y that satisfy these conditions.
To complete the proof we need to show that we obtain the desired expected value. This
follows from the fact that after Y stages (with the corresponding probability) only at most
θ/2 of the stages correspond to adversary deviations, while in 1 − θ/2 of the stages an
expected payoff of Opt(Π(ε,T ))− ε is obtained. 2
Hence, once we have reached a situation where we have a policy that can obtain
the desired value if the adversary behaves “nicely”, we can modify this policy to a
policy which obtains almost the desired value or learns a new fact about the states
(with overwhelming probability). Thus, we tradeoff some exploitation for exploration in
a manner that guarantees that if the adversary plays an unknown column polynomially
many times, we will learn this column after a polynomial number of steps. If the adversary
rarely plays that column, we will rarely encounter it, and so the possible losses stemming
from the randomization effect are almost surely insignificant given a sufficiently long (but
polynomial) number of steps.
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7. The algorithm and its analysis
The LSG algorithm can be executed for any desired number of steps t < ∞. For
sufficiently large values of t (polynomial in the problem parameters) a near optimal average
return is guaranteed, as stated in Theorem 1. The algorithm consists of the following steps:
(1) Initialize the set L of known states to be empty.
(2) If the current state is not in L:
(a) Randomly sample an action and execute it.
(b) If following this sampling the current state has been visited enough times (see
Definition 2, Lemma 1, and the discussion after Lemma 1), and at least one
column of the game associated with it is known, add it to the set of known
states L.
(3) If the current state is in L (i.e., a known state), perform an off-line computation
on ML in order to check whether a value of at least Opt(ΠM(T , ε)) − ε can be
guaranteed, assuming the adversary uses only actions that correspond to fully known
columns.
(4) If such a value can be guaranteed by a policy pi , then the policy pim is executed. 4
The run of pim is halted whenever a deviation of the adversary from the actions
associated with fully known columns is observed, when the agent deviates from pi ,
when we have reached an unknown state, or when a new column in a state in L
becomes fully known.
(5) Otherwise, a payoff of Opt(ΠM(T , ε)) − ε cannot be obtained, and a (global)
exploration policy pi ′ is executed (see Section 5) for T steps or until an unknown
state is reached. This policy is guaranteed by Lemma 2 to reach a state outside L
with probability of at least ε/Pmax within T steps.
(6) In all cases, whenever an entry in a stage game is learned, the value of it is kept in
memory.
We now prove Theorem 1 by showing that LSG has the desired properties. In the course
of the proof we also establish more precise bounds on its running time.
Theorem 2. The LSG algorithm attains an average reward of (1− φ)(OptM(Π(ε,T ))−
2ε) in time polynomial in N,T , ε, δ,φ with probability of at least 1− δ.
Proof. First, notice that the algorithm’s execution can be separated into two stages. In
the first stage, we do not have an exploitation policy, while in the second stage we have
an exploitation policy. We claim that (with high probability) each such stage will take a
polynomial number of steps.
Consider the first stage in which we do not have an exploitation policy. This stage
will end at least as soon as we know all the model parameters. As explained following
Lemma 2, there is a polynomial number of parameters to learn. Each execution of the
exploration policy leads to learning one such parameter within T steps with a probability
polynomial in the problem parameters (see below). Using standard Chernoff bound
4 Recall that pim performs the optimal policy with respect to known states with some amount of local
exploration.
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analysis, it immediately follows that with sufficiently high probability we will execute
at most a polynomial number of T -step explorations before all parameters are known. As
for the second, exploitation stage, Lemma 3 guarantees that (with sufficient probability) it
will take a polynomial number of steps.
Next, consider the expected payoff. We have provided a polynomial bound on the
number of exploration steps. We have shown, in Lemma 3 that the exploitation stage
will attain near-optimal reward. We can now simply repeat the exploitation stage for a
sufficiently large (polynomial) number of steps so that the (bounded) losses of the initial
exploration stage are compensated for by the (sufficiently large) exploitation stage.
To provide a more explicit bound on the running times and the failure probability, we
now consider the five sources of failure of our algorithm. We will take steps to ensure that
the probability of failure for any one of these reasons is no more than δ/5, yielding the
desired conclusion.
(1) In some states the algorithm may have a poor estimate of the true next-state
distribution. As we established earlier, we need to know the transition probabilities
within ( ε
NT Pmax
)2. Consider a set of trials, where we select action a in state s.
Consider the probability of moving from state s to state t given action a in a given
trial, and denote it by p. Notice that there are Nk2 such probabilities (one for each
game and pair of agent-adversary actions). Therefore, we would like to show that
the probability of failure in estimating p is less than δ5Nk2 . Let Xi be an indicator
random variable that is 1 iff we moved to state t when we were in state s and
selected an action a in trial i . Let Zi =Xi−p. ThenE(Zi)= 0, and |Zi |6 1. Then,
Chernoff bound implies that (for anyK1) Prob(
∑K1
i=1Zi >K12/3) < e−K1
1/3/2
. This
implies that
Prob
(∑K1
i=1Xi
K1
− p >K−1/31
)
< e−K
1/3
1 /2.
Similarly, we can define Z′i = p−Xi , and get by Chernoff bound that
Prob
(
K1∑
i=1
Z′i > K
2/3
1
)
< e−K
1/3
1 /2.
This implies that
Prob
(
p−
∑K1
i=1Xi
K1
>K
−1/3
1
)
< e−K
1/3
1 /2.
Hence, we get that
Prob
(∣∣∣∣∑K1i=1XiK1 − p
∣∣∣∣>K−1/31 )< 2e−K1/31 /2.
We now choose K1 such that K1−1/3 < ( εNTPmax )
2
, and 2e−K
1/3
1 /2 < δ5Nk2 . This is
obtained by taking K1 =max((NTPmaxε )6,−8 ln3( δ10Nk2 ))+ 1.
The above guarantees that we fail in getting the desired approximation with a
probability which is less than δ/5.
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(2) When sampling a random action in state s, we have only a probability of 1/k of
hitting the action a. We need to get K1 hits of action a in order to get the desired
statistics. Therefore, we show that after some K2 attempts per stage game, where
K2 is polynomial in K1 we will obtain the desired K1 hits with probability which
is no less than 1− δ5kN . Since there are N states and k actions, this will give us a
failure probability of less than δ/5 due to this reason. Let Xi be an indicator random
variable, whereXi = 1 iff we select a in the state s, and 0 if we select another action
in that state. Let Zi =Xi − 1k , and Z′i = 1k −Xi , and apply Chernoff bound on the
sum of Zi ’s and Z′is as before. We get
Prob
(∣∣∣∣∣
K2∑
i=1
Xi −K2k
∣∣∣∣∣>K1/32
)
< 2e−K
1/3
2 /2.
The desired result is now obtained by choosingK2 such that K2k+K1/32 >K1, and
2e−K
1/3
2 /2 < δ5kN .(3) The previous analysis implies that after no more than NK2 visits to the set of
unknown states, we will be able to learn an unknown state with an appropriately
small probability of failure. Actually, the above result gives a per-state bound,
but using the pigeon-hole principle, we extend it to a set of states and denote the
required bound byK3 (=K2N). The Exploit or Explore Lemma gives a probability
of α/Pmax of getting to explore. We now wish to show that after K4 attempts to
explore (i.e., when we do not exploit), we obtain the K3 required visits. Let Xi
be an indicator random variable which is 1 if we reach the exploration state (l0 in
Lemma 2) when we do not exploit, and 0 otherwise. Let Zi = Xi − αPmax , and let
Z′i = αPmax −Xi , and apply Chernoff bound on the sum of Zi and Z′i as before. We
get that
Prob
(∣∣∣∣∣
K4∑
i=1
Xi − K4α
Pmax
∣∣∣∣∣>K1/34
)
< 2e−K
1/3
4 /2.
We can now choose K4 such that K1/34 + K αPmax > K ′3 and 2e−K
1/3
4 /2 < δ5k2N to
guarantee that we will have a failure probability of less than δ/5 due to this reason.
(4) When we perform T -step exploitation with no local exploration we reach an
expected return of Opt(ΠM(T , ε))−ε, but the actual return may be lower. This point
is handled by the fact that after polynomially many local exploitations are carried
out, Opt(ΠM(T , ε))− 32ε can be obtained with a probability of failure of at most
δ/5. This is obtained by standard Chernoff bounds, and makes use of the fact that
the standard deviation of the expected reward in a T -step policy is bounded because
the maximal reward is bounded by Pmax. More specifically, consider z = MnT
exploitation stages for some M > 0. Denote the average return in an exploitation
stage by µ, and let Xi denote the return in the ith exploitation stage (1 6 i 6 z).
Let Yi = µ−XiPmax . Notice that |Yi | 6 1, and that E(Yi) = 0. Chernoff bound implies
that: Prob(
∑z
j=1 Yj > z2/3) < e−z
1/3/2 This implies that the average return along
z iterations is at most Pmax/z1/3 lower than µ with probability of at least e−z
1/3/2
.
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By choosingM such that z > (2Pmax/ε)3, and z > 8(ln(δ/5))−3, we get the desired
result: with probability less than δ/5 the value obtained will not be more than ε/2
lower than the expected value.
(5) The agent may get a low payoff because it does not know the entries in some column
and does not learn new entries in unknown columns. This is handled by Lemma 3,
where we can choose the failure probability, γ , as needed.
By making the failure probability less than δ/5 for each of the above stages, we are able to
get the desired result.
From the proof, we can also observe the bounds on running times required to obtain
this result. First, the exploration stage requires no more than K4 steps, and we have seen
that K4 is polynomial in the problem parameters. Notice that in practice, the only bound
that the implementer of the algorithm needs to maintain is the K1 bound on the sample
size used to estimate the transition probabilities. Next, we can commence the exploitation
stage. Here, we need to ensure that the number of steps performed is greater than both the
parameter z described in item (4) above and the parameter Y described in Lemma 3. In
addition, we must compensate for the potential losses from the exploration stage. That is,
if we explored forK steps (where we know thatK 6K4), then the exploitation stage must
last at least K ′ steps, where PmaxK/K ′ 6 ε.
Finally, we remove the assumptions that both the value and its ε-return mixing time are
known. This is straightforward and almost identical to the treatment given by [5]. First, as
to knowledge of the value, this is needed when we have to decide whether to explore or
exploit. Lemma 2 states that we can either get enough return or we have a sufficiently high
probability of reaching a new state quickly. We can calculate the probability of reaching a
new state quickly without knowledge of the value. Whenever that probability is greater than
the desired bound, we shall explore. As explained earlier, with overwhelming probability,
we shall remain with known states only after polynomially many exploration phases. If the
probability of reaching a new state quickly is small, we can immediately deduce that the
optimal policy for our current, approximate model is indeed a near-optimal policy.
Next, we must deal with the lack of knowledge of T . The idea is as follows: from the
proof of the algorithm’s properties, one can deduce some polynomial P in the problem
parameters such that if T is the mixing-time, then after P(T ) steps we are guaranteed, with
probability 1− δ, the desirable return. Hence, we can simply attempt to run this algorithm
for T = 1,2,3, . . . . For each value of T , we run the algorithm P(T ) time. Suppose that T0
is the mixing time, then after O(P (T0)2) steps, we will obtain the desirable return. 2
One thing to notice is that this algorithm does not have a final halting time and will
be applied continuously as long as the agent is functioning in its environment. The only
caveat is that at some point our current mixing time candidate T will be exponential in the
actual mixing time T0, at which point each step of the algorithm will require an exponential
calculation. However, this will occur only after an exponential number of steps. This is true
for the E3 algorithm too.
Another point worth mentioning is that in SCSGs, the agent may never know some of the
columns. Consequently, if pi is the optimal policy given full information about the game,
the agent may actually converge to a policy pi ′ that differs from pi , but which yields the
best return given the adversary’s actual behavior. This return will be no smaller than the
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return guaranteed by pi . The mixing time of pi ′ will, in general, differ from the mixing time
of pi . However, we are guaranteed that if T0 is the ε-return mixing time of pi , and v is its
value, after time polynomial in T0, the agent’s actual return will be at least v (subject to the
deviations afforded by the theorem).
8. Conclusion
We described an algorithm for learning in single-controller stochastic games. This
algorithm extends earlier work of Kearns and Singh [5] on learning in MDPs using the
techniques of Monderer and Tennenholtz for learning in repeated games [7]. In describing
the algorithm we aimed for clarity rather than efficiency, with the sole constraint of
providing a polynomial time algorithm. A more careful analysis will lead to reduced
running time.
Extension of this result to SGs in general remains an open problem. Unfortunately, a
straightforward extension of the results presented here is not possible. In SGs, stationary
equilibria do not always exist, nor are there known polynomial time solution algorithms
for SGs in general. In fact, it is not known whether SGs have finite mixing time. This first
fact implies that our approach for defining the value of an SCSG does not work for SGs
in general because we cannot restrict our attention to stationary policies, and hence, we
must take into account the initial state. Of course, we can choose to explicitly restrict our
attention to stationary policies for the agent and attempt to learn a policy that is optimal
with respect to this class of policies. This task seems feasible, but cannot be accomplished
by a straightforward extension of the Explore or Exploit Lemma for reasons described in
Section 5.
Finally, we remark that when we wish to model an agent acting in a non-stochastic
environment, an alternative model to an MDP would be an SG in which nature is taken as
the adversary. Hence, in appropriate circumstances our algorithm can be used to learn to
behave in non-stochastic environments.
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Appendix A. Chernoff bounds
In our analysis we make use of the following powerful result:
Theorem 3 (Chernoff). Let Xi, 1 6 i 6 n, be mutually independent with all E(Xi) = 0
and all |Xi |6 1. Let S =X1 +X2 + · · · +Xn. Then, Pr[S > a]< e−a2/2n.
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By appropriate normalization the above result can be applied in a straightforward
manner to Xis with some constant expectation and bounds on their values. This is indeed
the case in our study; this is easily implied by the fact the entries in the game matrices are
taken to be bounded.
To illustrate the way that the bound is used, consider a sequence of n trials (e.g.,
exploitations which use an optimal policy), where Xi measures the deviation from desired
quantity, C, at trial i (e.g., the deviation from the expected optimal payoff). Now take for
example a = n2/3, then we get that Pr[S > n2/3] < e−n1/3 . Hence, with overwhelming
probability (exponential in n), we get that the deviation of the actual average of the Xis
from the desired value is negligible (and smaller or equal to n−1/3 = n2/3/n).
This implies that if we are able to obtain a desired expected value, then by polynomially
many repetitions we will be able to actually obtain it with overwhelming probability.
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